Many concerns related to women in combat roles stem from two related assumption: (a) the existing structure and culture of the armed forces are well adapted to the requirements of combat; and (b) politically imposed change is harmful to the profes- sionalism and effectiveness of the military. These can be dangerous assumptions. Instead, the traditional “truths” about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and officers need to be periodically examined. Doing so can maximize the effectiveness of military organizations in a changing environment.
Rather than assuming the existing structure and culture of the armed forces are well adapted to perform in contemporary military campaigns, this article highlights what General Sir Rupert Smith called “the endemic flaws in the current approach.” The failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were not simply the consequences of flawed policies or strategic thinking, but also the nature of the military instrument at the disposal of political leadership and the conduct of its operations. The culture and structure of military organizations, their policies of recruitment, training, education, materiel procurement, doctrine writing, and deployments, all need to be carefully studied and potentially reconsidered. This involves the traditional “truths” about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and officers. The issue of women in combat should not be approached through the lens of damage control, but rather with an emphasis on maximizing the effectiveness of military organizations in the contemporary strategic context.